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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation: ILO Convention 185 on Seafarers’ Identity 
Document thirteen years after entering into 
force: Analyzing implementation 
challenges 
 
Degree:                              Master of Science 
 
Seafarers, by nature of their jobs, are forced to stay for months at a time away from 
family and friends on board vessels, considered their home and workplace. The 
opportunity to go ashore provides a mental and physical break from routine and 
contributes to good health and better attitudes towards their job.  
However, several life changing events, notably the 9/11 attacks in USA in 2001 came 
to change the general attitude towards border security leading to the revision of the 
Seafarers’ Identity Convention No 108 of 1958 to the Seafarers’ Identity Document 
Convention No 185 in 2003. The introduction of biometrics in this new convention 
aimed at facilitating shore leave, transfers and transit at maritime borders while 
respecting the security requirements of port States. Thirteen years after entering into 
force, not only is membership scant, many Members of the convention are still 
struggling fulfilling its requirements. 
This dissertation is a study of the challenges in implementation faced by these 
Members. It also explores some of the reasons preventing more ratifications. 
The data for analysis was obtained by exploiting reports of three key ILO meetings 
held on the convention in 2010, 2015 and 2016 in which issues related to the 
challenges faced by Governments in implementing the convention were examined. 
The information obtained was codified into recurring themes, analyzed and 
interpreted. The analysis and results are presented in chapter five. 
 
KEYWORDS: Seafarers’ Identity Document, challenges of implementation, shore leave, 
security, biometrics  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The seafarers’ identity document  
eafaring as part of international shipping is a unique profession. It requires 
individuals to spend long periods of time (two to six months on average per 
voyage) far away from home, working and interacting with a group of individuals 
in a limited environment known as the ship (Utureanu & Dragomir, 2016, p.3) and 
exposed to various stress factors and dangers. As the human element in an industry that 
transports almost 90% of the world trade by sea, seafarers provide vital skills and services 
to maritime transport through navigation, engine operations and fishing in fishing vessels 
(Yong, 2017, p.2). However, in spite of their immense contribution, the conditions of work 
for this unique set of workers are often below the required standards due to the temporary 
nature of their work and the unfavourable bodies of law they may be subjected to (Bauer, 
2008, p.643). 
The International Labour Organization (ILO), as a specialized tripartite organ of the 
United Nations (UN) empowered to promote rights at work and enhance social protection 
of workers worldwide, among other things, is very concerned with the wellbeing and 
security of the seafarer who has now been under the spotlight since the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States of America (USA) in 2001. Indeed, the terrorist attacks 
exposed a panoply of diverse security issues in different sectors which had never been 
taught of before or if they had, they had not been acted on. 
S 
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In the case of the seafarer, discussions prompted by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) at its 22nd General Assembly session and Diplomatic Conference on 
Maritime Security incited the ILO to revise the 1958 Convention on Seafarers’ Identity 
Document Convention No 108 (C108) to include security measures geared towards 
facilitating their shore leave or transit through a country related to the operation of ships 
(ILO, 2003a, p.1; ILO, 2015, p.2). Hence, the privilege which was granted to the seafarer 
with little or no regulations until the 1950s (McConnell, 2016, p.18) has now become a 
very complicated affair. This change was a result of growing security concerns as new 
flag States emerged with little restrictions to crew nationality combined with political 
tensions after World War II (McConnell, 2016, p.19). This complexity for access to shore 
leave led to the proposal of creating an international identity document by the 
International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) and the United Kingdom Navigators 
and Engineer Officer’s Union in 1954 to the ILO. This document was to help establish the 
status of genuine merchant seafarers. The outcome was Convention number 108 on 
Seafarers’ Identity Document (SID) which was revised to Convention number 185 in 2003 
to include biometric data after the said 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
The use of biometrics to enhance border security was spearheaded by the USA when it 
passed its Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act in May 2002, eight 
months after the 9/11 attacks. The said law contained a variety of sections relating to 
immigration control and called for the integration of a machine readable biometric method 
of authentication into passports over the period 2003-2006 (Stanton, Chango, & Owens, 
2008, p.10). Taking queue from this, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)1 
through its Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents 
(TAG/MRTD), carried out major revisions to Document 9303 Part 2 (Third edition, 2005) 
to harmonize specifications for machine readable passports, visas and other travel 
documents and provided, among others, structural features to enhance the security of 
the said documents (ICAO, 2005, p.I-1).  
                                                            
1 The International Civil Aviation Organization is a specialized agency of the UN established by States in 1944 to manage 
the administration and governance of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)  
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However, the ICAO has had several editions since 2005, the latest being the seventh 
edition of 2015 which is being referred to in the amended annexes to the SID C185 and 
to subsequent amendments. 
1.1.1 Comparing Seafarers’ Identity Documents No 108 and 185 
The peculiarity of Seafarers’ Identity Document Convention No 185 (C185) is that unlike 
its predecessor, it is not directed to States in their role as Flag States (article 2 of C108) 
but is directed substantively towards their role as labour suppliers (McConnell, 2016), 
that is, the State of nationality or permanent residence of the seafarer (article 1 of C185). 
The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) has a similar approach. It is the first 
convention in which the specific category of labour-supplying countries is introduced and 
it dedicates Regulation 5.3 to specify the responsibilities of labour-suppliers.  
Structure-wise, C185 is made up of eighteen articles, that is, four articles longer than 
C108, and three annexes which are an integral part of the Convention. Following is a 
brief comparison of the two conventions article by article. 
Article 1 
The definition of a seafarer is the same in both documents but with regards to 
interpretation in case of doubt, the competent authority is the one designated by the State 
of nationality or permanent residence of the seafarer for SID C185 whereas it was not 
specified in SID C108. In addition, SID C185 can be extended to fishing vessels after 
consultation with representatives of the fishing sector. 
Article 2 
Seafarers have the right to be issued with SIDs in conformity with provisions of both C108 
and C185 by State parties (Members) to the conventions. In C185, the said identity 
documents may be issued under conditions prescribed by national laws and regulations 
for the issuance of travel documents and only to citizens or permanent residents of a 
country unlike C108 which permitted countries to issue SIDs to nationals from any country 
regardless if they are nationals or permanent residents of the said country or not. 
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It may arise that a seafarer possesses SIDs issued under C108 and C185. This may 
come about where one document was issued by a Flag State under C108 and another 
from his/her State of nationality under C185. It becomes a problem when the SID 
provided by the Flag State is still valid. Labour-supplying States will have to be vigilant in 
this regard. 
Articles 3&4 of SID C108 and 3&7 of SID C185 
Article 3 in C108 is the same as article 7 in C185 while article 3 in C185 is the same as 
article 4 of SID C108. Article 3 of C185 is more detailed than article 4 of C108. It specifies, 
among other things: 
- the content and form of the SID with details set out in Annex I, the machine 
readability and availability of documents to Governments at low cost with difficulty 
to falsify and that the document is a stand-alone document and not a passport; 
- the maximum validity of the identity document being 10 years subject to renewal 
after the first 5 years for C185 while it was unspecified in C108;  
- the inclusion of biometric data in C185 as well as the harmonization of content 
and form. It is no longer at the discretion of Governments. Seafarers also have 
access to machines enabling them to inspect non-eye readable data. 
While article 3 of SID C108 simply states that the identity document shall be in the 
possession of the seafarer at all times, article 7 of C185 provides that the document could 
be placed in the custody of the captain with the seafarer’s consent for safekeeping and 
that it could be withdrawn by the issuing State if the conditions for issuance are no longer 
met. These conditions are to be drawn up in consultation with representatives of ship-
owners’ and seafarers’ organizations with a chance for the seafarer to appeal the 
decision. 
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Article 4 of SID C185 (new) 
It sets out how the National Electronic Database (NED) should be operated with details 
in Annex II. Moreover, a designated focal-point in each country is required to provide the 
necessary authentication to enquiring countries. 
Articles 5&6 of SID C108 and article 6 of SID C185 
Article 6 of C185 combines articles 5&6 of C108. The major additions are that reasonable 
advance notice must be made of the seafarer’s arrival to facilitate shore leave and that 
transit and verification of SIDs shall be at no cost to the seafarer. It is clearly stated in 
C185 that visas shall not be required for the purpose of shore leave but it is ambiguous 
in C108. Non-Members of C185 may require visas. 
Article 5 of SID C185 (new) 
It provides measures for Quality Control and Evaluation (QC&E) of procedures and 
issuance to maintain quality. Regular reporting is also required at least every 5 years to 
the Director-General (DG) of ILO with copies to representatives of ship-owners and 
seafarers’ organizations. 
Article 8 of SID C185 (new) 
Article 8, offers the possibilities for amendments of the three annexes and an opportunity 
to give written notices in case of reservations and difficulties. The possibility to amend 
the annexes only is a novelty. Decisions for amendments require a majority of at least 
two-thirds of the votes of delegates present at the International Labour Conference (ILC) 
including at least half the Members of C185. Any Member which does not agree to the 
amendments has six months to give a written notice to the DG of the ILO after its 
adoption. 
Article 9 of SID C85 (new) 
This addition to the convention provides the option of provisional application of the 
Convention by States which have already ratified C108 under two outlined conditions: 
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- that it is taking measures with a view to ratify the convention; and 
- SIDs issued by it under C185 will be accepted if requirements of articles 2 to 5 
are met and that it accepts SIDs issued by Members of C185.  
Articles 10 – 18 of SID C185 
Apart from article 10 which is the last addition stating that C185 revises C108, the rest of 
the articles are the same as articles 7-14 of C108. These are final provisions giving 
conditions of entry into force of the convention for Members, when to denounce the 
convention, notifications of the DG to the Members and communications to the Secretary-
General of the UN, how to proceed with the revision in whole or in part of the convention 
and the status of the convention and its Members should a new revising convention be 
adopted. 
1.1.2 The welfare of the seafarer at the center of it all 
It is not possible to discuss the seafarer’s identity document convention without mention 
of the welfare of the seafarer as they are connected. In fact, it is the concern of the 
wellbeing of the seafarer that led to the discussion and subsequent adoption of C108 in 
1958 and C185 in 2003.  
The unique working environment of the seafarer has a great influence on his/her 
psychological wellbeing. He is required to live and work in a confined place, far away 
from family and friends for prolonged periods exposed to the same physical environment 
and monotony. The number of environmental stressors present are therefore long-lasting 
(Doyle et al., 2016, p.199). To break the monotony, shore leave for a seafarer is a 
necessity. It permits him to interact with a new environment and people and to get medical 
and psychological care when needed. Unfortunately, these needs are not always 
considered by port States but also by the changing nature of the industry. Turn-around 
time is faster, crews are getting smaller and numerous inspections and paper work, 
among other things, leave little time for relaxation and when some do have time to go 
ashore, they are unable or discouraged because the ports are far from the nearest cities 
 
7 
and transportation is costly. Very few countries, if any at all, consider the needs of the 
seafarer when deciding on the location of a seaport.   
In customary international law, the right for temporal access to shore can be traced as 
far back as the sixteenth century in the Laws of Wisby and the Code of Oleron (Lee, 
2017, p.970). Nowadays, the ILO is the organization that sets international labour 
standards. The campaigners of the 1958 SID convention sought for the adoption, under 
ILO auspices, of an internationally recognized seafarer’s passport or similar document in 
view of the difficulties faced by seafarers with immigration and security regulations of 
different countries (ILO, 2003a, p.2). Though the final document fell short of their 
expectations, it still served as a common platform for reciprocal identification by 
contracting Governments. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks came to aggravate an already difficult situation. The threat of 
terrorism became more palpable and awareness more acute, prompting radical 
measures by the USA and with it, dragging many countries along. Border control at 
several entry points in many countries will never be the same again. The International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) of the IMO was rapidly adopted in 2002 and 
added as a new chapter XI-2 in the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) of 1974 to address maritime security. To facilitate shore leave, access to shore 
facilities and transit in the face of such stringent security measures, it was necessary that 
the seafarer could be positively identified and that such identity could be verified, hence 
the revision of C108 and the introduction of biometrics to create a new convention, SID 
C185.  
Before its adoption, two proposals were made: Creating a Protocol to C108 or a new 
Convention altogether. Most countries preferred the second option (ILO, 2003b, pp.158-
162). Further in time, C185 was not included in the MLC 2006 by reason of its recent 
amendment and adoption (ILO, 2006a, p.2). Compared to the consolidated conventions 
in the MLC, C185 was still very new with only four ratifications at the time the MLC was 
adopted in February 2006. The ILO probably needed more time to observe the workability 
of the convention. 
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Convention 185 was adopted in June 2003 at the 91st session of the ILC with 392 votes 
in favour, 20 abstentions and no votes against (Doumbia-Henry, 2003, p.130). So far, this 
convention has thirty-five ratifications, one of which is provisional. When compared with 
the thirty-nine other ILO conventions on seafarers, C185 is the second most ratified 
convention, after the MLC 2006, in the first fifteen years after their adoption. Though not 
satisfactory, this attests to the willingness of Governments to take into consideration the 
wellbeing of the seafarer while facilitating international commerce and securing their 
borders. 
1.2 Problem statement and motivation 
The advantages of using biometrics for identification is unquestionable. In 2010 alone, 
the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement through its biometrics programme 
removed more than 392,000 illegal aliens, about 50% of whom were convicted of diverse 
crimes (“New Zealand to trial biometrics as US immigration hails success of programme”, 
2010, p.1). Also, in May 2012, the Dubai's Expertise Centre Identity and Fraud 
Documents Agency said it caught 1,137 forged documents with its passport readers 
(Dubai's Golf News, 2012 cited in Gold, 2012). 
Member States of the ILO know and recognize the importance of biometrics to enhance 
safety and security. One would expect, however, that the advantages offered by this 
revised Convention will attract more ratifications. Nonetheless, it is not the case. Fifteen 
years after, not only are there few ratifications, many countries are still facing 
implementation difficulties. So far, only Russia has been declared fully compliant (ILC, 
2016, p.523).  
The success of C185 is dependent on the ability of member States to be able to 
authenticate the closed circuit chips embedded in the documents, if not, it has little 
advantage over the traditional, non-electronic SID. It is therefore imperative to identify 
and understand the bottlenecks to a smooth implementation. 
My motivation to do this research stems from the fact that the international community 
through the ILO and IMO is trying to unify security measures to facilitate the access of 
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the seafarer to the shore of whichever country s/he may find him/herself and this can only 
be achieved through a unified effort of all the stakeholders.   
1.3 Objectives 
This research aims to:  
a) identify and analyze the challenges behind the implementation challenges faced 
by Governments and to provide an outlook from the results;  
b) find out what are some of the bottlenecks preventing more ratifications. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research will be guided by the following questions: 
a) What are the requirements for the implementation of SID C185? 
b) Are the requirements feasible? Is there a need for change? 
c) What are the factors preventing effective implementation of SID C185? 
d) What are the obstacles preventing more ratifications? 
1.5 Methodology 
The chosen approach was qualitative as the objective of the research was to identify and 
understand the bottlenecks to a smooth implementation of the SID C185.  
The research questions were answered through secondary data analysis. Reports of ILO 
meetings held in connection to C185 were studied, codified into recurring themes, 
analyzed and interpreted. Primary and secondary sources of data from relevant books, 
reports, instruments, articles, official websites were used to further understand and 
substantiate on the challenges faced by Governments and other factors that impacted 
the implementation of the convention. 
1.6 Limitations 
This research has sought to provide a general overview of the factors that prevent 
effective implementation of the SID C185 through a secondary data analysis. This is a 
limitation because obtaining data directly from the sources may have brought out more 
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challenges and possible solutions. Nevertheless, the study provides essential elements 
worth considering for both Members and non-Members of the convention. 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: MARITIME SECURITY 
efore discussing implementation requirements and challenges of C185, it is 
important to have a discussion on maritime security. Security in general is top 
on the agenda of most nations, if not all, as it is linked to its sovereignty and the 
drive to protect its borders. Maritime transport security specifically has evolved over the 
years, shaped by several landmark events and developed into a major branch of 
international law influenced by a number of sources paramount among which is the IMO. 
This chapter will focus on the evolution of maritime security, the influence of major 
maritime incidents in shaping international and national law and what all these mean to 
the lay seafarer, unfortunately affected, due to the distinct nature of maritime transport.   
2.1 Early work of the IMO 
The IMO is a specialized agency of the UN that sets global standards for safety, security 
and environmental performance of international shipping (IMO, n.d). Created in 1948 at 
a UN Diplomatic Conference, the treaty came into force in 1958 and has since 
established itself as a treaty making body with fifty-four conventions in its portfolio. 
However, SOLAS 1948 and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS) 1948 revised pre-existed the IMO. The secretarial duties of these 
conventions were handed over to the IMO by resolutions A.2 (1) and A.8 (1) in 1959 
(Blanco-Bazan, 2004, p.271).  
The IMO is made up of five committees. The:  
B 
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- Maritime Safety Committee (MSC);  
- Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC);  
- Legal Committee (LC);  
- Technical Co-operation Committee (TCC); and  
- Facilitation Committee (FAL).  
Seven sub-committees assist the MSC and MEPC. The MSC, along with the Assembly 
and the Council, was one of the main organs established by the 1948 Convention on the 
IMO and today, it handles all matters relating to the safety of shipping, as well as 
addresses maritime security issues and piracy and armed robbery against ships (IMO, 
2013). This was not always the case. In the beginning, the IMO, through the MSC 
constrained itself to safety of navigation, restricting its antipollution role to the acceptance 
of secretarial duties in respect of OILPOL 542 and its amendments (Blanco-Bazan, 2004, 
p.271; Basaran, 2016, p.3). That focus was nonetheless going to be shaken with the 1985 
Achille Lauro hijacking. 
2.2 The Achille Lauro incident: the first turning point  
As a general rule, human beings tend to be reactive than proactive. It is easier to react 
to the known than prepare for the unknown. The IMO was no different. Being a young 
organization still trying to establish itself on the world stage, it had many lessons to learn 
along the way. The first major lesson was from the Torrey Canyon oil spill. Being more 
on the observational side, the IMO began taking pollution and the protection of the marine 
environment very seriously after the 1967 wreck off the coast of Cornwall which spilled 
about 35 million gallons of heavy crude oil along the coasts of Cornwall, Brittany and 
Normandy (Blanco-Bazan, 2004, p.271). A former IMO Secretary General had something 
interesting to say about that incident. Sir Collin Goad, in an interview, observed that the 
incident and the increased involvement of the IMO in environmental issues as a result, 
was a “godsend” (M'Gonigle & Zacher, 1979, p.42), and rightly so.  
                                                            
2 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 was the first international convention 
adopted to regulate pollution of the marine environment by oil. It has been superseded by the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 73/78 
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Acts such as piracy can be traced as far back as seafaring and the IMO had started doing 
something about it in the late 1970s by initiating several studies into unlawful seizures of 
ships, barratry and maritime fraud (Mitropolous, 2005, p.151) and in 1981, the IMO 
Assembly adopted Resolution 504 (XII) entitled "Barratry, Unlawful Seizure Of Ships And 
Their Cargoes And Other Forms Of Maritime Fraud”. The UN on its part adopted, in 1982, 
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with seven articles 
(101 to 107) dedicated to piracy. Everything seemed to be in order until the Achille Lauro 
incident of October 7, 1985. This occurrence has been written on extensively and I 
therefore do not feel the need to give a detailed account of what happened. Suffice it to 
say that the attack was orchestrated by a terrorist group called the Palestine Liberation 
Front against Israel for the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners held by them (Attard, 2014, 
p.499). This action was unlike any act of piracy which are acts generally carried out for 
private ends as defined in UNCLOS article 101, for example theft. The act was geared 
toward the release of prisoners of a given nationality different from the one in which they 
were held, giving it a political character. This was what surprised the international 
community who was not quite sure under which regime to address the crime, sparking a 
new debate over the provisions governing piracy.  
The IMO went to work. On the 20th of November 1985 (IMO, 1985), the Assembly adopted 
resolution a.584(14) on “Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten The Safety 
Of Ships And The Security Of Their Passengers And Crews” and the following year it 
issued MSC/Cir.443 on “Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers And 
Crew Onboard Ships” with the objective of assisting member States in the application of 
resolution a.584(14). It did not stop there. In March 1988, the Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 88) was 
adopted. This convention provided States parties a license to take the appropriate 
measures according to their national laws against persons committing unlawful acts 
against vessels. 
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2.3 The 9/11 attacks: the second turning point 
If the international community taught it had seen it all with regards to security issues in 
the Achille Lauro incident, it was in for a shock. The USA was victim of a terrorist attack 
in a scenario that could easily be confounded to a Hollywood dramatic action movie. Over 
three thousand persons were killed (Attard, 2014, p.510). This incidence exposed a lot of 
security issues in the USA and provided lessons for other countries. Many countries took 
measures to reinforce their land and airport entry borders and preventive measures 
extended to maritime transport which had not yet experienced this form of attack.  
The IMO once again reacted to face this new threat. Consultations with IMO member 
States in the same year of the attack resulted to Assembly resolution A.924(22) on 
“Review Measures And Procedures To Prevent Acts Of Terrorism Which Threaten The 
Security Of Passengers And Crews And Safety Of Ships” in November 2001 (IMO, 2001). 
In it, the Assembly called on the MSC, LC and the FAL to review all IMO instruments to 
ascertain if any updating was needed and to adopt new measures if need be. These 
committees were also to take into account the work of other international organizations 
competent in the development of other transport related standards on safety and security 
by land, air and sea. This led to the review of the SUA convention and its Protocol,3 the 
introduction of a new chapter in SOLAS 19744 and the revision of C108 which is currently 
the focus of this study. 
Haven gone through the major incidents in history that have changed the world’s 
conception of maritime security, the next question comes to mind. 
2.4 What is maritime security?  
Maritime security is considered a buzzword (Bueger, 2015) with no clear definition. It 
could be said that the definition varies with the context in which it is used. From the 
                                                            
3 The amendments to the SUA Convention and its Protocol were adopted in 2005 as Protocols to the SUA Treaties. These 
amendments introduced additional definitions to encompass the new realities of acts of violence and provided further 
measures for cooperation among States among other things. 
4 The SOLAS Convention of 1974 was rapidly amended in 2002 to include a new Chapter XI-2 on “Special Measures To 
Enhance Maritime Security” in which we find the ISPS Code in order to address maritime security related issues in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks 
 
15 
military perspective for instance, maritime security revolves around protecting the 
territorial sovereignty and integrity from any form of threat or from the shipping operator’s 
point of view, it involves securing cargo and maritime transport so that goods arrive at 
their destinations incident free (Klein, 2009, p.5). 
One of the meanings of security, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionaries, is “the 
state of being free from danger and threat.” Following this line of thought, “maritime 
security” will involve taking the necessary measures to keep the oceans free from danger 
and threat. However, the words “danger” and “threat” could mean many things and with 
a vast and multifaceted sector like maritime transport, many stakeholder interest are 
involved. Some academics prefer to define maritime security in terms of measures. For 
instance, Mukherjee & Brownrigg (2013) define maritime security as “those measures 
deployed by maritime administrations, ship-owners, ship operators and managers, port 
facilities and offshore installation administrations, and other maritime organizations for 
protection against unlawful acts such as piracy, armed robbery, terrorism and maritime 
violence” (p.250). Klein (2009) puts it generally by referring to maritime security as “the 
protection of a State’s land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment 
and society from certain harmful acts occurring at, or from the sea” (p.8). 
So, maritime security, unlike maritime safety which is focused on the safety of the ship 
and the prevention of accidents, is concerned with criminal acts perpetrated against the 
ship and its crew, passengers and/or cargo by human beings and which could extend to 
land. The seafarer unfortunately finds him/herself in the cross fire as nations, learning 
from the various terrorist attacks are protecting their countries from threats coming from 
the sea, for the most part linked to terrorism. This is because, unlike piracy or armed 
robbery at sea which are geographically constrained and whose motives are private, 
terrorism is politically driven and has no boundaries. Acts of terrorism could be 
orchestrated against navigation, fixed platforms in the continental shelf and could even 
originate from the sea and move to land as demonstrated by the 2008 Mumbai attacks 
(Ronzitti, 2012, p.33). 
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A number of reported cases and investigations have revealed the use of commercial and 
passenger vessels for the transportation of explosives, weapons, ammunition and 
members of terrorist organizations sometimes with the knowledge and participation of the 
ship-owner and/or crew. For instance, in 2002, the Captain of M/V Sara, owned by a 
company called NOVA (suspected of being an al-Qaeda “front” company), radioed 
maritime authorities in Italy informing them of the presence of 15 Pakistani men on-board 
the vessel whom the ship-owner forced him to take on-board in Casablanca, Morocco. 
Though the 15 men claimed to be crewmen when questioned by USA and Italian naval 
officers, investigations linked them to the terrorist group al-Qaeda (Mintz, 2002). In 
another occasion in 2003, the break-bulk cargo M/V Dona Julia Inez transported three 
Islamic terrorists with complicity of the Captain to the port of Sambo Bonita (Colon), 
Panama were they were greeted by a Muslim businessman in the Colon Free Zone 
(McNicholas, 2008, p.257; 2012, p.55). Also, the possibility that ships could themselves 
be used as weapons for destruction just as the aircrafts in the 9/11 attacks were used is 
envisaged by some governments. 
Unfortunately, these “bad seeds” contribute in making shore leave difficult for honest 
seafarers in certain seaports who simply need a respite from routine.  
2.5 Maritime Border Security 
Maritime border security (MBS) is one of the means by which a nation exercises its 
sovereignty in a bid to protect its population. The intended effect is sometimes pushed to 
the extreme to the detriment of life offshore. The USA is a good example of such extreme 
actions mainly because it had been badly affected by the 9/11 attacks. There have been 
many complaints against the government in this regard. A recent case involving some 
crew members of Hanjin ships,5 docked in US waters, who were refused shore leave 
made headlines in 2016 (Lee, 2017, p.961). This is because new federal laws instituted 
after the 9/11 attacks require seafarers to have visas to qualify for shore access in 
                                                            
5 These vessels belonged to Hanjin Shpping, a South Korean shipping company which filed for bankruptcy protection on 
August 31, 2016. For more information https://www.joc.com/special-topics/hanjin-shipping-bankruptcy. Retrieved on 
September 12, 2018 
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contradiction of international conventions such as the 1965 Convention on the Facilitation 
of International Maritime Traffic (FAL 65) of the IMO of which the USA is a Party. A 2017 
survey conducted by the Seamen’s Church Institute (SCI) in collaboration with the North 
American Maritime Ministry Association (NAMMA) in various ports in the USA revealed 
that 9.5% of the 9,886 seafarers surveyed were denied shore leave. 72.9% of the 
rejection cases were as a result of the absence of a visa. Notwithstanding, this was a 
significant decrease of 8.7% from the 2016 survey (SCI, 2017). 
The United States is not the only country requiring visas to have access to shore facilities. 
Other countries include Panama, Australia and the Syrian Arab Republic. In Australia, 
the 2007 Migration Amendment (Maritime Crew) Bill replaced the Special Purpose Visa 
(SPV) with the Maritime Crew Visa (MCV). Unlike the SPV which was granted to foreign 
crew on presentation of a valid passport and a document establishing their employment 
onboard a commercial vessel on arrival, the MCV requires for applications to be made 
before arrival to Australia to allow for security checks. Plus, it is free of charge (Federal 
Register of Legislation, n.d).  
Other countries, like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) do not require visas to grant shore 
leave. According to Ministerial Decree No. 569 of 2016 (article 11) of the UAE, Temporary 
Entry Permits are provided which are valid for 24 hours to foreign seafarers to have 
access to various shore facilities. The application is made by the vessel’s agent to the 
Immigration Office at the port of arrival only after the vessel has arrived in that particular 
port (Clyde&Co, 2017).  
Parallelly, it has been gathered that certain nationalities face particular discrimination in 
the exercise of MBS (SCI, 2017; ITF Seafarers, n.d), further increasing the frustration for 
these seafarers. For this reason, section 3G of the FAL 65, which reinforces the ILO SID 
provisions for the non-requirement of visas for seafarers, underwent amendments (IMO, 
2016) which came into force on 1 January 2018. Standard 3.44 adds that:  
“Shore leave shall be allowed in a manner which excludes discrimination such as 
on the grounds of nationality, race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, or social 
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origin and irrespective of the flag State of the ship on which they are employed, 
engaged or work.” 
An additional standard 3.44bis provides that public authorities shall communicate any 
reasons to the seafarer concerned and the master for refusal and put it in writing if 
requested by the seafarer or the master of the vessel. 
The MLC, 2006 also reinforces the provisions for shore leave. The objective of Regulation 
4.4 is “To ensure that seafarers working on board a ship have access to shore-based 
facilities and services to secure their health and well-being”.6 This is however too general 
and standard A4.4 does not make any considerable substantiation. Facilitation of shore 
leave is specifically addressed in Guideline B4.4.6 where it is specifically stated that 
“Every effort should be made by those responsible in port and on-board a ship to facilitate 
shore leave for seafarers as soon as possible after a ship’s arrival” (MLC, 2006, p.67,70). 
Another problem that may arise is actual access to the welfare facilities as 
aforementioned. More seaports are being constructed far from the cities and there is little 
collaboration in some cases with ship-owners’, seafarers’ and voluntary organizations to 
fill in the gap. Guidelines are however soft law, meaning, Members of the MLC are not 
obliged to follow them but are required to give due consideration.  
It is the sovereign right of every nation to protect its borders from all forms of threat. 
Seafarers unfortunately face discrimination at the maritime border, far less or non-
existent in some countries and extreme in others. This partly has to do with what is at 
stake for each country. While not siding with the aggressive reaction of the USA to the 
9/11 attacks, only a nation who has experienced such a traumatic event will understand 
                                                            
6 Regulation 4.4 provides that: 
1. “Each Member shall ensure that shore-based welfare facilities, where they exist, are easily accessible. The 
Member shall also promote the development of welfare facilities, such as those listed in the Code, in 
designated ports to provide seafarers on ships that are in its ports with access to adequate welfare facilities 
and services.  
2. The responsibilities of each Member with respect to shore-based facilities, such as welfare, cultural, 
recreational and information facilities and services, are set out in the Code”. 
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certain actions, but there are other ways around to achieve the same goal. The C185 is 
one of such solutions. 
The recent amendments to the FAL 65 are laudable. Countries which are not Members 
of C108 or C185 but Members of the FAL 65 are under obligation to respect these 
regulations. This is however no guarantee as some Authorities can find their way around 
these rules. What needs to change is how seafarers are viewed, from being the threat to 
security to being allies in combatting crime. Adopting a defensive approach towards 
seafarers breeds negative feelings of resentment, anger and hostility making some prone 
to terrorist ideologies thereby opening vulnerable points of entry. Including them, on the 
other hand, as an integral part of the defense mechanism through fair treatment will 
motivate them to do the right things and even to go the extra mile to avert crime. 
2.6 Summary  
The law on maritime security is constantly evolving and unfortunately as much as the 
maritime sector tries to be proactive, it can only truly learn from errors and incidents of 
security breaches. However, enforcing security measures at the border is just as 
important as looking after the welfare of the seafarer. As border security measures and 
technology advances, so does the mind of the criminal. There will always be threats to 
national security but nations need to strike the balance between protecting their borders 
and concern for the wellbeing of this unique set of workers who contribute so much to 
international trade.  
In addition, it has been established that seafaring is one of the riskiest professions one 
can find and as the years go by it is becoming less attractive for younger generations 
who are opting for stability and more attractive jobs on land. Facilitating shore leave is 
definitely one way and an incentive to maintain the supply seafarers.  
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CHAPTER THREE: TECHNOLOGY 
he technological requirement of the C185 is biometrics which is an age old 
technic of identification. The first known practical example of the use of 
biometrics was a form of finger printing used in China in the 14th century (Uzoka 
& Ndzinge, 2009, p.1551). Post 9/11, the science of biometrics as we know now was still 
a very much nascent technology (Jefferson, 2010, p.24). Over the years, biometrics has 
emerged as the unique function for executing the tasks of accurate identification of 
persons by their bodily or behavioural traits (Vandommele, 2010, cited in Amirthalingam 
& Radhamani, 2016, p.381). 
Biometrics (Bio-Life and metrics-measure) is generally defined as measurable 
characteristics of individuals based on their physiological features (e.g face, voice) or 
behavioral patterns (e.g signature) that can be used to recognize or verify their identity 
(Ailisto, Vildjiounaite, Lindholm, Mäkelä, & Peltola, 2006, p.325; Bennett, 2000, cited in 
Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009, p.1550). Other ways of verification and identification can be 
grouped into: (1) what you have (e.g Debit card), and (2) what you know (e.g passwords, 
personal identification numbers) (Bolle, Connell, Pankanti, Ratha, & Senior, 2004; 
Chauhan, Arora, & Kaul, 2010, p.213). 
The adoption of an ILO convention with biometric requirements was a first for the 
organization. It was a move that offered a timely solution to an identification and security 
problem at maritime borders both for the seafarers and the port State.  
T 
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The focus of this chapter is on the technical requirements of the SID which has evolved 
over time. Divided into three main parts, the chapter will cover the technical requirements 
and challenges of C185 before it was amended, the new requirements of the 2016 
amendments and a summary. 
3.1 Technical requirements of SID C185 before the June 2016 
amendments 
Traditional biometric identification systems include face, fingerprint, voice, iris, retina, 
keystroke, ear, hand geometry, signature and gait. Some new systems include lip-print, 
tongue-print, electrocardiogram (ECG), and dental radiography (Chauhan, Arora & Kaul, 
2010, p.213). However, the identification system chosen by the ILO was the minutiae-
based fingerprint stored in a bar code.  
The materials used, dimensions and placement of data of the said document were to 
conform to the ICAO specification as contained in Document 9303 (Doc 9303) Part 3 (2nd 
edition, 2002) 7 or to Document 9303 Part 1 (5th edition, 2003) 8. Several standards were 
also taken into consideration during the conception of the biometric capabilities of the 
SID (ILO, 2006b, p.2). These standards include: 
1) ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000;9  
2) ISO/IEC FCD 19784; 10   
3) ISO/IEC CD 19794-2:2005; 11  
4) ISO 3166-1:1997; 12  
5) ISO/IEC 8859-15:1999; 13  
                                                            
7 These documents were withdrawn after the release of the new editions in 2006 for Part I and in 2008 for Part 3. Members 
were however free to use the new versions in lieu of the outdated versions as the portions dealing with the physical layout 
had not changed substantively (ILO, 2010, p.4; ILO, 2015d, p.6).   
8 Idem 
9 American National Standard for Information Systems/National Institute of Standards and Technology - Information 
Technology Laboratory 1-2000: Data format for the interchange of fingerprint information - table 5.  
10 Information technology - Biometric application programming interface - Part 1: BioAPI specification 
11 Biometric data interchange formats - Part 2: Finger minutiae data 
12 Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes 
13 Information technology - 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character sets - Part 15: Latin alphabet No. 9 
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6) ISO/IEC 15438:2001; 14  
7) ISO/IEC 9945-1:2003; 15 and 
8) ISO/IEC 15415:2004. 16 
3.1.1  Model for Seafarers’ Identity Document 
Article 3 alongside Annex I cover the model and technical aspects of the document and 
can be analyzed under three subheadings, Content, Form and System requirements. The 
contents of the SID were to follow the model provided for in Annex I; the form of the 
document were to fulfill the requirements of the ICAO documents mentioned above and 
the system used to obtain the biometric information needed to satisfy certain conditions. 
It is important to note that the ILO while setting these standards is conscious of the 
financial burden these requirements might place on Governments but expects 
nonetheless that minimum quality standards be not compromised. 
3.1.1.1 Form 
The new identity document with biometric capabilities is a Machine Readable Travel 
Document (MRTD). It is an alternative to the passport and a stand-alone document to 
facilitate access to shore and transit of seafarers. The document is to be:  
- no larger than a normal passport; 
- simple and concise to include all important information with no excess space; 
- made of durable material with special consideration for conditions at sea to 
withstand years of wear and tear;  
- machine-readable to facilitate its verification; and 
- difficult to falsify (prevent counterfeit and forgery) by using products which are not 
easily accessible by the general public and judiciously, to be combined with 
                                                            
14 Information technology - Automatic identification and data capture techniques - Bar code symbology specifications - 
PDF417 
15 Information technology - Portable operating system interface (POSIX) - Part 1: Base definitions 
16 Information technology - Automatic identification and data capture techniques - Bar code print quality test specification 
- Two dimensional symbols 
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specialized manufacturing processes and design systems which will require 
specialized equipment and expertise.  
To reinforce the security features of the document, parties are to include at least one of 
the following in the fabrication process:  
1) watermarks;  
2) ultraviolet security features;  
3) special inks;  
4) special colour designs;  
5) perforated images;  
6) holograms;  
7) laser engraving;  
8) micro-printing; and  
9) heat-sealed lamination. 
Manufacturing these documents to align with the prescription of the “form” carries the 
bulk of the cost as care needs to be taken to ensure their quality and protect their 
authenticity. 
3.1.1.2 Content 
Compared to the “form” requirements, the standards in this section are relatively easy to 
comply with as it does not require any specialized technology or expertise. The content 
of the SID can be divided into four parts: the information of the seafarer, information on 
the issuing authority, unique identification numbers/features and general information.  
Information of the seafarer: It was decided during the deliberation of C185 at the 91st 
session of the ILC in 2003 that the basic information of the seafarer should be maintained 
as found in C108 in continual respect of the privacy of seafarers (ILO, 2003a, p.6). This 
information includes: 
a) Full name of the seafarer; 
b) Sex; 
 
24 
c) Date and place of birth; 
d) Nationality; 
e) Any special physical characteristics that may assist identification; 
f) Digital or original picture of the seafarer; and 
g) Signature of the seafarer. 
Information on the issuing authority: The only similarity of this section with C108 is the 
mandatory mention of the name of the issuing authority. Though the other pieces of 
information may seem obvious, they were added in the light of the objectives of C185 to 
ensure uniformity and to prevent ambiguity. The information required here includes: 
a) Name of issuing authority. This would mean a mandatory header with the name 
of the State of nationality or residence of the seafarer and designated organization 
responsible for issuing the document; 
b) Contact of the issuing authority (telephone numbers, e-mail address, website 
corresponding to the focal-point each party has to nominate); 
c) Official stamp or seal of the issuing authority. 
Unique identification numbers and features, absent in C108 include information that 
differentiates one document from the other. They comprise: 
a) Unique document number; 
b) Personal identification number (optional); 
c) Biometric template with fingerprint printed as numbers in a bar code. 
General information and features are common to all the documents produced and 
include:  
a) Date of expiry, the validity of which shall not exceed ten years subject to renewal 
after the first five years; 
b) Place of issue; 
c) Type or designation of document; 
d) A machine-readable zone; 
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e) Two statements: (1) stating the purpose of the document and (2) specifying that 
the document is a stand-alone document. 
3.1.1.3 System requirements 
The biometric data collection process outlined in article 3(8) provides first and foremost 
that it be carried out in a way that respects the dignity and privacy of the concerned with 
no risk to his/her health or discomfort. It further goes on to provide that: 
- the biometric information collected shall be visible on the document; 
- the equipment used for provision and verification of the biometric is user friendly, 
available at low cost to governments and can be conveniently operated in ports 
and on-board vessels; 
- the system used for processing the biometric data provides uniform and reliable 
results consistently to authenticate the identity of the holder. 
The choice of the fingerprint for biometric identification at the time fulfilled the expectation 
of the tripartite consultative body. The finger image minutiae and not the finger image 
pattern was chosen as the best fit to achieve application requirements for C185 (ILO, 
2006b, p.3) because a majority of the nations that responded to the ILO questionnaire in 
2002 (ILO, 2003b, p.74) indicated their intention to use fingerprint data to search against 
existing government databases which are typically Automated Fingerprint Information 
Systems databases designed to facilitate searches using minutiae-template based 
systems (ILO, 2006b, p.12). It was a logical choice as it would gain general acceptance. 
The choice of a bar code to store the biometric data (two fingerprint templates) in a two-
dimensional PDF417 on the other hand, was based on cost as it was less expensive than 
the embedded chip storage technology (ILO, 2006b, p.2). This therefore meant less 
storage space. However, the storage format chosen was based on draft ISO standards 
dated October 2003 and there were no known manufacturers who had products that 
supported the standards (ILO, 2004, p.2). Modifications to the products had to be made 
as a result to meet the standards. The International Labour Office (ILOffice) of the ILO 
saw the need to conduct interoperable tests to develop a list of compliant biometric 
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products for Members to use when implementing the convention and this was 
accomplished through the ILO SID Biometric Testing Campaign (ILO, 2004). 
3.1.2  Interoperability tests 
In 2004, the ILO Governing Body adopted the technical standard, ILO SID-0002 Finger 
Minutiae-Based Biometric Profile for the Seafarers’ Identity Documents, with the objective 
of achieving global interoperability of Members’ implemented systems as specified in 
C185 (ILO, 2004, p.3). However, as earlier mentioned, the ISO standards used were still 
draft standards and the existing products needed to be modified and tested. In addition, 
the working environment of the seafarers exposed them to situations which could affect 
their skin and fingers. It was therefore necessary not only to produce a list of compliant 
products but also to ascertain that the working conditions of the seafarer have no adverse 
effects on their skin and fingerprints (ILO, 2004, p.5). 
A total of four test campaigns were carried out between 2004 and 2008. The first test 
campaign was carried out in two phases. Phase one was conducted in a laboratory with 
a non-seafaring population to do a pre-selection of products that would be used in the 
second phase to be conducted on genuine seafarers (ILO, 2004. p.6). Seven products 
were conformant to the required Biometric Interchange Record and the initial 
interoperability tests requirements (ILO, 2004). 
The second phase was conducted on 126 seafarers, both male and female of 30 different 
nationalities, a wide age range and diverse job descriptions, over the period of September 
to October 2004 on board the cruise vessel Crystal Harmony (ILO, 2004, p.6; ILO, 2005, 
p.3). Of the seven approved products in the first phase, referred to as Biometric Systems 
A to G, only two products, A and F attained ILO objectives of 1% false reject report 17 (or 
less) at 1% false accept report 18 and the two products were also the best performing 
combination of two products (ILO, 2004, p.35). 
                                                            
17 False Reject Report: Obtained when a genuine test subject attempted to match his/her own biometric interchange 
record.  
18 False Accept Report: Obtained when an imposter test subject attempted to match his/her data different from his/her 
biometric interchange record. 
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While the first campaign proved useful in identifying products that could be used by 
governments for enrolment and verification of seafarer’s fingerprints, the low success rate 
meant interoperability using the ISO standard may not be as easy as envisaged. 
Consequentially, it was important to find out why the other products failed the test and if 
they could be improved on in order to correct the deficiency. For this reason, a second 
test follow-on study with the same group of products was carried out in 2005 using offline 
images stored during the first campaign (ILO, 2005, p.2,3). This test involved six of the 
original seven products. After identifying possible sources of interoperability limitations 
and the vendors providing new versions of their products, there was a slight improvement 
in the interoperability test conducted (ILO, 2005, p.4). As a result, a third product, Product 
C, was added to the list along with the previous two products (ILO, 2005, p.4). The follow-
on test also led to the revision of ILO SID-0002 after expert consultation (ILO, 2005, p.11). 
The third and fourth campaigns were conducted in Ottawa, Canada in 2006 and 2008 
respectively. They added a total of nine new products and two replacement products of 
previously approved products (ILO, 2006c, pp.1,2; ILO, 2009, p.4) on ILO’s list of 
approved products making a total of twelve approved products. 
3.1.3 Challenges of the two dimensional finger minutiae bar   
code 
The ILO had invested in carrying out the various interoperability test campaigns which 
were fruitful by providing products that governments could use but was unfortunately still 
not attracting more ratifications as wanted.  
In 2006 and 2008, the ICAO released new editions of Doc 9303 Part I (5th edition, 2003) 
and Part 3 (2nd edition, 2002) respectively. Acting on the concern of ILO on the potential 
effects of the changes, ICAO in 2009 affirmed that ILO members could still use the new 
editions in lieu of the former as the physical layout in the new and old editions had not 
changed in any substantive way (ILO, 2010a, p.4). 
The efforts of the ILO were not enough to stop the inevitable changes. In 2010, the ILO 
held a consultative meeting to discuss, among other things, the challenges faced by 
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governments in implementing the convention and to examine proposals for improving the 
technical aspects of the Convention’s implementation through the ISO/IEC standard 
24713-3 19 (ILO, 2010a, p.5). Two main difficulties with regards to the fingerprint stored 
in a barcode biometric were raised: 
- difficulty in identifying suitable vendors to provide the needed equipment by some 
governments; 
- technology was changing from barcode to biometric chip. With the launching of 
ICAO e-passports, the number of persons holding passports that would potentially 
have biometric chips was greater than the number of SIDs using the barcode. 
This was seen as double expenditure (ILO, 2010a, p.12). 
With regards to the proposed improvements, there was a general consensus that the 
technical details of the barcode had to be updated to ISO standards (ILO, 2010a, p.17) 
as the ILO faced the reality that technology was changing and that most of the border 
security control standards developed since the last interoperability test in 2008 were no 
longer available and several of the listed companies no longer existed as independent 
entities (ILO, 2015a, p.3). This prompted a consultative expert meeting in 2015 in which 
it was agreed that a chip-enabled SID should be developed and that the biometric should 
be changed from a fingerprint in a barcode to a facial image (ILO, 2015b, p.15). This 
meeting was in turn followed-up by an Ad Hoc Tripartite Maritime Committee meeting in 
2016.  
3.2 Technical requirements of the June 2016 amendments 
The ILC adopted, at its 105th session in June 2016, proposed amendments to the 
Annexes of C185 prepared by the Ad Hoc Tripartite Maritime Committee which met in 
2016 (ILO, 2016a, p.3-2/1). The technical model of C185 Annex I had now to conform to 
the mandatory requirements for an electronic MRTD contained in Doc 9303 (seventh 
                                                            
19 ISO/IEC 24713-3 on Biometric profiles for interoperability and data interchange – Part 3: Biometrics-based verification 
and identification of seafarers was specially developed by the ISO-IEC JTC 1, a joint technical committee of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to support 
the C185 and published in August 2009 (ILO, 2010, p.5).   
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edition, 2015) on MRTD and to any subsequent amendments. These amendments 
entered into force on 8 June 2017 but for countries which ratified the convention before 
it entered into force, a transition period of five years has been provided for the necessary 
adjustments (ILO, 2016a, p.3-2/7). 
The content, form and system requirements provided in Article 3 and Annex I remained 
substantively the same but for adjustments to replace the fingerprint template in a two-
dimensional bar code with a facial image stored in a contactless chip. For this convention, 
the contactless chip is required to contain only information that is already visible in the 
visual-inspection zone (VIZ) and the machine-readable zone (MRZ) of the SID plus, data 
required for the operation of the chip and its security features. 
The following section will highlight the biometric changes, discuss the different MRTDs 
formats and the impact of those changes.  
3.2.1  Biometric changes 
Based on the new structure of Doc 9303, six of the twelve parts have been directly 
referred to in Annex I. The following changes have been made: 
3.2.1.1 Form 
- Physical characteristics are to conform to section 2 of Part 3; 
- Printing and typefaces used in the VIZ and the MRZ are to conform to sections 3 
and 4 of Part 3; 
- A contactless integrated circuit with storage capacity of at least 32 kilobytes is to 
meet the requirements of Part 9; 
- Mandatory Logical Data Structure (LDS) standards to conform to Part 10; 
- Encoding and introducing digital signatures following Parts 11 and 12 
respectively; 
- Protection from fraudulent activities, tampering and photograph substitution 
according to Part 2. 
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The security features of the document are different and each SID is to contain at least 
three of them instead of one as required before the amendments. Details of these 
features can be found in Appendix A to part 2 of Doc 9303. Some features include: 
1) optically variable features in the substrate or laminate of the identity document; 
2) tactile features in the substrate of the identity document; 
3) laser-perforated features in the substrate; 
4) microprinted text in the background; and 
5) ink with optically variable properties.  
3.2.1.2 Content 
The sole addition to the content is the inclusion of a “chip inside” symbol as described in 
section 2.3 of Part 9 of Doc 9303. The other details are the same with more precision on 
how the information is to be presented except for two areas: “Biometric template with 
fingerprint printed as numbers in a bar code” was changed to a “Machine-readable zone” 
and the requirement of an optional “Personal Identification Number” was removed. 
3.2.2  MRTDs formats  
Three options for presenting the SID have been provided for in C185: 
- Size 1 Machine Readable Official Travel Document (MROTD) (TD1) described in 
Part 5 of Doc 9303; 
- Size 2 MROTD (TD2) described in Part 6 of Doc 9303; and 
- Size 3 MRTD (TD3) described in Part 4 of Doc 9303. 
TD1 and TD2 are card formats with different dimensions and specifications with TD2 
being larger in dimension than TD1. TD3 on the other hand, is in the form of a book with 
a page dedicated to provide information about the card holder, issuance, and validity of 
the document (ICAO, 2015, parts 4, 5, 6).  
3.2.3  Impact of the amendments 
The amendments to C185 were necessary but not without consequences. Several 
countries had started or had already put in place structures for the production of the SIDs. 
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With regards to biometric, the technical background paper prepared in 2015 for 
discussion at the Meeting of Experts concerning the convention mentions estimates of 
approximately $10-30 more in cost to produce identity documents with the facial image 
stored in a contactless chip (ILO, 2015a, p.17). This cost, however, can only be achieved 
if the infrastructure used for the issuance of the document is the same as that used for e-
passports (ILO, 2015a, p.19).  
The change also means additional cost incurred by some governments to acquire 
complete issuance systems. This will be further discussed in the next chapter on 
infrastructural requirements.   
3.3 Summary  
The biometric capabilities of the SID have been drafted with care and consideration for 
interoperability of the technology and the potential cost for governments. The choice of 
the barcode was based on the available technology supported by Doc 9303 and some 
ISO standards at the time while the fingerprint was based on the popularity among 
countries. Lack of sufficiently available vendors to provide the necessary equipment and 
the evolution of technology contributed to the difficulty in its implementation. The 2016 
amendments were to respond to the technology change and to provide a SID which could 
be authenticated with the same mechanism as that used for e-passports. Since the June 
2016 amendments, the convention has registered a promising four ratifications with the 
latest in January 2018.  Reports submitted for examination by the Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations will provide valuable 
information on the implementation of the convention.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: INFRASTRUCTURE 
he last chapter discussed the technical requirements of C185. But for the whole 
system to succeed, governments need to put in place certain infrastructures. 
These are specified in articles four and five of C185. Article four is linked to Annex 
II and article five is linked to Annex III. Just like Annex I, these articles were also amended 
in 2016. This chapter will discuss the two main structures that have to be set up for the 
production, authentication, verification and maintenance of the system. It will also discuss 
the different proposals put forward by the ILO to mitigate cost. 
4.1 National electronic database 
The NED is covered under article 4 alongside Annex II. The purpose of these provisions 
is to ensure accountability and follow-up by Members of the delivery of SIDs. Members 
are to keep a record of documents issued, suspended and withdrawn. In continual 
respect for the privacy of the seafarer, the database shall contain no more information 
than that prescribed in Annex II. The seafarer has the possibility to check and confirm the 
data stored. 
The responsibility of the permanent focal-point is to respond to queries from competent 
authorities of ILO Members to verify the authenticity and validity of SIDs issued by its 
designated authority. Immigration or other competent authorities of the member State 
could get information through the focal-point or have direct access to the database 
depending on the preference of the State. Each Member is responsible to communicate 
the details of the focal-point to the ILOffice which shall in turn maintain a list to be 
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communicated to all ILO Members. This is also another important way for competent 
authorities of each State to ascertain the correct contact information of each focal-point 
as in the event of doubt, a border officer may not trust the information provided on the 
SID. It will however be the responsibility of each State to distribute such a list as widely 
as possible to every border control check point in its country. This will require good 
communication, transparency, availability of appropriate logistics and cooperation, 
among other things, within SID issuing Administrations and collaborating Administrations 
especially the Immigration authorities.   
A proposal for a focal-point coordination centre (FPCC) or an ICAO Public Key Directory 
(PKD) was put forward in the technical background paper for discussion at the Meeting 
of Experts concerning C185 (ILO, 2015a). The FPCC entailed having a central 
coordination centre, in collaboration with national focal-points, to respond to inquiries 
from border agents, visa officers or other competent authorities concerning SIDs. The 
ICAO PKD provided the same services with the difference that it existed already with e-
passports. Members of the ICAO PKD system just had to use the same ICAO Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) 20 digital signature for the SID. During the meeting of experts, 
preference was given to ICAO PKD (ILO, 2015b, p.13). It should be noted that the ICAO 
PKD system is not compulsory for Members of C185 but the ICAO PKI is (ILO, 2016b, 
p.14). The addition of a digital signature nevertheless comes at an extra cost estimated 
at between $20,000 and $100,000 to obtain hardware and software to support secure 
digital signatures for Members of C185 (ILO, 2015a, p.14).  
4.2 Quality control and Evaluations 
The purpose of article 5 and Annex III is to ensure that the processes for the production, 
deliverance and issuance of SIDs is not compromised at any level as well as the 
maintenance of the database. 
                                                            
20 The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) enables the creation and subsequent verification of digital signatures on e-MRTD 
objects to ensure the signed data is authentic and has not been modified (see ICAO, 2015, part 12 p.1). 
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Regular reports on independent evaluations of systems and procedures of the 
Administration are to be made by each Member to the DG of the ILOffice at least every 
five years who shall in turn make it available to other Members.  
An important innovation for this convention is the introduction in paragraph 8 of article 5 
of a mechanism to produce a list of Members which have complied with the minimum 
requirements mentioned in paragraph 1 of the same article. This mechanism, which can 
be compared to the provisions of Section A-I/8 of the Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention 95 of the IMO on quality standards, has the 
goal to create confidence and acceptance of documents issued by the Members and 
hopefully non-Members too. 
Annex III is comprised of Part A on Mandatory results and Part B on Recommended 
procedures and practices. While Part A is obligatory, Part B is not but, is to be given due 
consideration to provide additional guidance to achieve the results required in Part A. 
Both Parts center the responsibility on the SID-issuing authority irrespective if some of 
the processes are subcontracted. The alternative measures used by Members will be 
different for each country. 
When compared to Article VI of the MLC 2006 which allows Members to use substantially 
equivalent measures if they are not in a position to implement the rights and principles in 
the manner set out in mandatory Part A of the code, nothing of that sought is provided 
for in C185. Members are not required to indicate alternative measures used to attain 
minimum results in implementing an SID issuance system required in Part A. This 
supposes that the focus is on the results. 
The five areas for which processes and procedures need to be put in place are: 
1. the production and delivery of blank SIDs; 
2. the custody, handling and accountability for blank and completed SIDs; 
3. the processing of applications, the completion of the blank SIDs into personalized 
SIDs by the authority and unit responsibility for issuing them and the delivery of 
the SIDs; 
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4. the operation and maintenance of the database; and 
5. the quality control of procedures and periodic evaluations. 
The investment involved in developing a complete SID issuance and QC&E system will 
depend on the country and whether they choose to produce blank SIDs themselves or 
delegate it to an enterprise. The cost of an SID issuance system alone depends mainly 
on the number of enrolment sites and the number of seafarers in each country. A 
complete system has been estimated to cost anywhere from a few hundred thousand to 
a few million dollars, aside from the cost for training personnel and maintaining a 
continuously available focal-point and an up-to-date NED (ILO, 2015a, p.23). 
Nevertheless, countries which have already invested in producing e-passports according 
to Doc 9303 and are participating in the ICAO PKD system could spend considerably less 
if they chose to use the same infrastructure for the issuance of e-SIDs. 
4.3 ILO Proposals to mitigate technical complexities and cost 
The ILO in the several meetings it has held on C185 since its adoption has put forward a 
number of proposals to mitigate cost. These proposals will be discussed under two 
subheadings: International cooperation and National alternatives. 
4.3.1  International cooperation 
The ILO acknowledged the need for technical cooperation from the beginning as it 
adopted a resolution in this regard at the same time it adopted C185. In it, the ILO 
encouraged Members to agree among themselves on measures of cooperation to share 
technology, expertise and resources and for countries with advanced technology to assist 
Members with less advanced technology (ILO, 2003c, p.108). It also availed itself of its 
resources for Members who required assistance. In line with this resolution, the ILO has 
put forward the following proposals: 
4.3.1.1 A global, shared procurement system 
This proposal was put forward in 2010 (ILO, 2010, p.10, 11) and 2015 (ILO, 2015, p.24). 
In this system, the ILO is to play a central role in facilitating the global procurement of the 
components of an SID issuance system including enrolment stations, printers and central 
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issuance software, in conjunction with countries with good expertise in IT systems and 
procurement. The hardware and software components agreed on will then be made 
available to interested countries at a fixed price provided by the successful bidder(s). If 
many countries partake in this procurement system, there would be economies of scale 
resulting in less expenditure. An added advantage of this procurement system is that 
independent evaluations would be simpler as the hardware and software elements will 
be almost identical for participating countries. 
4.3.1.2 A regional, shared SID system 
Here, groups of countries could work together to build SID issuance systems, focal-point 
centers and regional electronic databases for all collaborating countries. Nevertheless, 
each country will be responsible for deciding on the eligibility of its seafarers before their 
enrolment. The printing of SIDs will be done at the central facility hosting the system 
which will also store each country’s NED in separate data silos and available to each 
focal-point. The success of this system will reduce cost and facilitate independent 
evaluations, which in this case, will only take place at the central site. 
4.3.1.3 Donor donates its own SID system 
This system relies on the good will of a donor country. The SID system will be developed 
in the donor country from which it will make copies of its software available to other 
countries for free. The countries benefitting from this donation should find it much easier 
in implementing C185. Software independent evaluations will also be made easy in the 
countries using the same software. 
4.3.1.4 Donor funded independent development of a SID system with 
independent intellectual property 
This proposal seems like the ultimate solution. It entails a donor country or group of donor 
countries to sponsor the development of an SID issuance system, including enrolment, 
printing, stock control and a NED from scratch by a third party. The intellectual property 
of the software could then be transferred to the ILO which will make it available to 
Members of C185. The estimated cost is between one to three million USD. Like the 
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previous proposals, independent evaluations will be simpler and quicker. There will be a 
sole initial evaluation of the software at the ILO and the results will be used as the basis 
for subsequent evaluations in benefiting countries. The net results for the countries is 
less cost and better implementation of C185. 
Unfortunately, there was no feedback from the report on these four proposals, which were 
under Option A-7 of the 2015 technical background paper. These options are however 
still available to Members and several options can be used together.  
4.3.2  National alternatives 
These proposals, presented under Part III of a technical background paper (ILO, 2016c) 
focuses on how Members could organize their national SIDs issuance processes. 
4.3.2.1 Production of the SID by the SID issuing authority itself 
In this option, the issuing authority will be responsible for the entire process from the 
receipt of the application to production and deliverance. For countries which intend to 
participate in the PKD, they will have to bear the full cost of participation. The advantage 
of this option is that the issuing authority has full control and access to the system. 
4.3.2.2 Production of the SID by the e-passport issuing authority 
The second option will be to delegate the entire issuance process to the national e-
passport issuing authority for countries issuing e-passports. This is to prevent a country 
from spending twice to participate in the PKD. The disadvantage is the loss of control by 
the SID issuing authority as it will have to delegate its functions to another authority in 
the same country coupled with the lack of training of e-passport issuing personnel in 
verifying seafarer information. This could be solved if the two authorities share 
responsibilities with regards to their specific domains. 
4.3.2.3 Enrolment of the seafarer by the SID issuing authority with 
production of the SID being contracted 
The last option proposed by the ILO in this regard entails the issuance of SIDs by an SID 
issuing authority but subcontract parts of the process to an independent entity outside 
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the control of any one ILO Member. This is not intended to compromise the fundamental 
duties of each Member to secure the process. The independent entity, which could be 
called a Central Processing Office (CPO), has the possibility to offer its services to more 
than one national e-SID issuing authority. The CPO will only need to develop issuance 
software. This option will not only reduce Member expenses in developing an issuance 
system but also the cost in managing the PKI. The downside will be to find a willing entity 
to take the role of a CPO. 
The position of the ICAO  
The ICAO, at the request of the ILO, provided technical advice on the abovementioned 
three options. The first option was rejected on the basis that ICAO did not allow more 
than one participant per country in the PKD, in the case where the country is also 
producing e-passports, mainly for security reasons. The third option was accepted on 
condition that the ILO took the role of the CPO in collaboration with the United Nations 
Laisser-Passez issuing authority in order to use its Country Signing Certification Authority 
(CSCA). The United Nations, however, rejected that suggestion to use its CSCA for that 
purpose (ILO, 2016b, p.7). The second option was fully approved by ICAO, encouraging 
the division of responsibilities between the e-passport and e-SID issuing authorities. 
While the second option was well received, especially by countries which participated 
already in the PKD, others expressed their reservations. Bangladesh, for example, was 
concerned that collaboration between the passport and SID issuing authorities will cause 
more delays (ILO, 2016b, p.9). Unfortunately, there are no “one size fits all” clear cut 
solutions. What could be beneficial to one country may have an opposite effect on 
another. 
4.3.2.4 Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
This option was not considered by the ILO but is supported under Part B of Annex III of 
C185. Strict monitoring by the SID issuing authorities is however required. According to 
the PPP Knowledge Center, a PPP is "a long-term contract between a private party and 
a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party 
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bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to 
performance"(World bank, n.d). The figure below depicts a spectrum of PPP contracts. 
 
Fig 5: Spectrum of PPP contracts. Retrieved from https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/agreements  
Some Governments, such as India (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017) and Nigeria (IRIS 
Smart Technologies Limited, n.d) have resorted to PPPs in the issuance of national e-
passports. 
For India, a PPP was signed between Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in 2006 under 
the National e-Governance Plan and the Ministry of External Affairs. Its role was to set 
up and manage the Data center and disaster recovery operations. In this line, it handles 
passport applications, takes biometrics, does office networking and takes care of the 
citizen portal, among other duties (TCS, n.d). The Ministry of External Affairs on the other 
hand handles sovereign functions such as verifying, granting, issuing, revocating and 
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impounding passports (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013). So far, the PPP is a success 
story. 
In the case of Nigeria, the private partner, IRIS Smart Technologies Limited (ISTL) 
designed, supplied, installed, tested, commissioned and now operates, supports and 
maintains the complete e-passport system at its own expense since 2007 when the PPP 
was signed. Compensation is obtained from issuing passports. The personnel are 
however supplied by the Nigerian Immigration Service who is responsible for registering 
applications, personalizing and issuing passports, dealing with daily queries and 
managing the passport inventory. The Central Data Center, which can be compared to 
the NED for e-SIDs, is hosted in the ISTL facility and includes the PKI. This partnership 
is clouded with the concern of the CSCA being in the control of ISTL which jeopardizes 
the national security of the country (D’Albore, 2017). As of July 2017, the Government is 
seriously considering the local production of the passports (Nigeria Politics Online, n.d). 
Until then, the PPP with ISTL is still ongoing.   
Each country has its own rules, laws and framework and therefore decides on what works 
best for it. The e-SID is relatively new but PPPs are definitely workable as can be seen 
in the examples from which inspiration and lessons can be drawn. 
4.4 Summary 
The infrastructure prescribed by the C185 is very appropriate to achieve its objectives. 
But as much as many countries acknowledge that, the investments and technical 
complexities cannot be ignored. Technical cooperation has nonetheless been strongly 
encouraged by the ILO, from sharing technology to outsourcing certain processes and 
even proposing a global procurement system. PPP is another option worth exploring. The 
essential is, whatever option a country decides to use, it will have to fulfill its obligations 
under articles four and five of C185. Security should in no way be compromised.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
he objective of this dissertation is to understand and analyze the challenges 
faced by Members of C185 in its implementation. The main sources of 
information for this analysis are the ILO reports of three key meetings held on the 
convention after its adoption. These meetings have discussed issues related to the 
challenges faced by Governments in implementing the convention and on strategies to 
increase the number of ratifications. They are: 
1. Consultations on the Seafarers’ Identity Document Convention (Revised), 2003, 
(No 185) held 23 – 24 September 2010; 
2. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’ Identity 
Document Convention (Revised), 2003, (No 185) held 4 – 6 February 2015; and 
3. Ad Hoc Tripartite Maritime Committee established for the Seafarers’ Identity 
Document Convention (Revised), 2003, (No 185) held 10 -12 February 2016. 
5.1  Data analysis 
The first step in analyzing the data was to draw up a table which classified the relevant 
information as shown in the table presented in Annex I. The data was then further broken 
down as follows: 
5.1.1  Attendance 
Column two of the table presented in Annex I is a list of the countries which attended one 
or more of the three meetings. A lot of information can be obtained and deduced from 
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this column. Of the 68 countries represented as percentages in figure1, 20 are Members 
of C185, 24 are Members of C108 and 24 are non-Members to either conventions. When 
compared to the total number of Members of C185 and C108, the total attendance of 
Members of C185 against non-attendance (figure 2) is higher than that of Members of 
C108 (figure 3). This is an indication of the degree of interest, priority or importance 
placed in the convention by ILO member States. 
 
                
Fig.1: Total attendance registered for the three key ILO meetings on C185 
 
                  
Fig.2: Attendance registered of Members of C185 which attended any meeting against Members which did 
not attend any 
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Fig.3: Attendance registered of Members of C108 which attended any meeting against Parties which did not 
attend any 
The bulk of attendance was registered in 2010 at 51 countries. This dropped to 25 in 
2015 and increased to 37 in 2016. Forty-three countries which attended the 2010 meeting 
were non-Members of C185. Since then, ten ratifications have been registered in a space 
of 8 years. This is encouraging considering the biometric challenges and financial 
engagement in maintaining the SID issuance system. Also, a majority of one-time 
attendances was registered in 2010 (twenty-one), followed by 2016 (twelve) and lastly 
2015 (three). Figure 4 shows the frequency of attendances from the three meetings. 
Interestingly, the majority of the 15 consistent participants are Members of C108 
(Canada, Latvia, Liberia, Norway, Panama, Spain and the United Kingdom) followed by 
Members of C185 (France, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Philippines and Russia 
Federation) and lastly non-Members of either convention (China, South Africa and the 
USA). One would have expected that more Members of C185 would be interested in 
improving the convention and finding ways to facilitate its implementation. 
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Fig.4: Frequency of registered attendance  
So far, only 10 countries have automatically denounced C108 by ratifying C185 which is 
relatively low. This is not totally negative as Members of both C108 and C185 have the 
obligation to recognize SIDs issued under C185. The downside to this, however, is that 
there is no real advantage of SIDs issued under C185 over C108 since both documents 
are accepted but Members of C185 have to spend more for the same privilege.  
5.1.2  Implementation Challenges  
Column eight of the table presented in Annex I represents a list of difficulties faced by 
Members of C185. These were presented as far as possible in the exact wordings and 
order presented in the reports. The next phase was to categorize synonymous alternative 
phrasings directly relevant to the topic represented by different colours and the frequency 
with which they were mentioned. This categorization produced four themes (table 1). 
Unfortunately, very few participants voiced the difficulties faced by their countries. This is 
probably because most of the other participants identified with the issues and did not see 
the need for repetition. Nevertheless, from those that did, a hierarchy of difficulties was 
established as follows: 
1. Restricted access to shore by some port States; 
2. Financial and Technical difficulties; 
3. Legislative and Administrative issues; and 
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4. Few ratifications. 
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Table 1: Classification of the implementation challenges faced by Members of C185 
The financial and technical aspects have been dealt with in chapters three and four. The 
focus shall be on points 1, 3 and 4. 
5.1.2.1           Restricted access to shore by some port States 
Restricting access to shore by port States is a challenge for Members of C185. This is 
because after overcoming the technical and financial barriers to issue SIDs, it is 
frustrating to find out that their efforts are not yielding the required fruit, that is contributing 
to facilitate shore access for their seafarers when they call at foreign ports. Bangladesh, 
for instance, complained that some of its seafarers were refused shore leave in some 
ports because it was not in the list of States that had ratified C108. Other Members that 
had similar complaints include Indonesia, Korea and Russia. No specific countries were 
pointed out. Generally, typically restrictive countries include the USA and Australia. It has 
also been reported that seafarers faced shore leave challenges in the Schengen area of 
the European Union (EU) (ISWAN, 2013). Currently, the EU is in the process of revising 
Regulation No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas to respond to present security and migratory 
realities. Hopefully, with the proposals of the European and International Social Partners 
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in the maritime sector 21 (ECSA, ETF, ICS & ITF, 2018), the final regulation will be more 
favourable towards seafarers and boost the commitment of Members of C185.    
5.1.2.2          Legislative and Administrative issues 
Legislative procedures and Administrative organizations vary from country to country. 
Legislative difficulties are mostly linked to the relationship between national law and 
public international law (PIL). There are two approaches in this regard: Monism and 
Dualism.  
A monist State views PIL and national law as a single system of law, whereas the dualist 
State views the two as separate and distinct systems existing alongside each other 
(Ferreira & Ferreira-Synman, 2014, p.1471). In a pure monist State on one hand, PIL is 
directly enforceable and in a pure dualist State on the other hand, PIL has to be translated 
into national law. Legislative difficulties will most likely be faced by dualist States where 
international law has not been domesticated and is in conflict with national law. This 
affects implementation of C185 in such countries as it cannot be enforced. To avoid such 
difficulty, some countries adapt their national laws to international law before ratifying the 
necessary conventions. Canada for example is a Member of C108 but is issuing SIDs in 
compliance with C185 and is envisaging developing regulatory instruments in this regard 
(ILO, 2015b, p.4). If or when it ratifies C185, it will not face that challenge as there will be 
no conflicts of laws. 
Administrative wise, the challenge may stem from inter-ministerial or inter-departmental 
collaboration. Bangladesh in the meeting held in 2016 expressed concern on this issue 
fearing further delays in implementation of the convention if passport and SID issuing 
authorities had to collaborate.  As mentioned in chapter four, the issuance of SIDs may 
need the intervention of one or more ministries or departments. Whereas this 
collaboration may work in some countries, it may be very difficult or absolutely impossible 
                                                            
21 Looking after seafarers’ welfare, the European and the international Social Partners in the Maritime Sector which 
contributed a proposal to the Commission of the European Union in December 2017 are the European Community 
Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA), the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), the International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS) and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF). The proposal advocated for seafarers to be 
grouped as special Professional travelers 
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in others. Countries in such situations have to work harder to ensure successful 
implementation of the convention. Administrative challenges could also be as a result of 
bureaucracy slowing down processes.  
5.1.2.3           Few ratifications 
This challenge may have been mentioned just once but it is not any less important. The 
Republic of Korea had indicated in the 2010 meeting that it had not issued any new SIDs 
since it ratified C185 in 2007 principally because major port States had not ratified the 
convention. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Handbook of Statistics, Asia is by far the largest trading region followed by 
Europe, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and finally Oceania 
(UNCTAD, 2017a, p.72). This will place some Asian countries among the major port 
countries in the world. Based on the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport ranking of 
the top 40 container terminals in the world for the year 2016, China tops the list with 13 
terminals, followed by the USA with 5 terminals, Spain, Germany and Malaysia follow 
with 2 terminals each and the rest with one terminal each (UNCTAD, 2017b, p.65). In 
total 13 Asian port States, 6 European port States, 1 North American port State and 1 
South American port State were represented in the list. However, this is only indicative 
as it is based solely on container terminals. 
This is significant because if major port States are not Members of C185, it may be 
discouraging to Members of the convention which, at this point, is too late for they now 
have obligations which must be fulfilled. China and the USA are Members of neither C108 
nor 185 but have participated in all the three ILO meetings under scrutiny. It can only be 
hoped that these, and many others, will not only acknowledge the importance of C185 
but take further action by ratifying the convention.   
5.1.3            Obstacles to ratification 
While the focus of this dissertation is on the implementation challenges of C185, it is also 
important to look at factors that discourage countries from ratifying the convention. Table 
2 below presents the obstacles along with the frequency with which they were mentioned. 
The first three factors are the same as the first three challenges mentioned in table 1. 
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Factors one, two and three of table 2 have a higher frequency than in table 1 indicating 
higher participation of non-Members in expressing their concerns with regards to 
ratification.     
 
Obstacles to ratification 
 
 
No 
 
 
01 
 
02 
 
03 
 
04 
 
05 
 
 
Theme  
Financial 
and 
technical 
difficulties 
Restricted 
access to 
shore by 
some port 
States 
Few 
ratifications 
Visa 
requirements 
Requirement 
of article 6 a 
barrier to 
ratification 
 
Frequency 
 
 
08 
 
05 
 
02 
 
01 
 
02 
Table 2: Classification of obstacles to ratification by non-Members of C185 
The factors on Financial and technical difficulties, Restricted access to shore by some 
port States and Few ratifications have similar explanations to those provided for under 
challenges in implementing C185 but with the difference that they are reasons some 
countries will not ratify the convention. 
With regards to the factor on Visa requirements by some countries such as the USA, 
Australia and Panama, Norway was clear that this was one obstacle for it and called for 
dialogue with such countries. Certainly, this stance is shared by many more countries. 
Norway, in the meantime, intended issuing SIDs in compliance with C185. 
Finally, for the fifth factor, countries such as Panama and the USA were restricted by the 
Requirement of article 6, precisely paragraph 6 which stipulates that “seafarers shall not 
be required to hold a visa” for shore leave. Panama is considering though, the possibility 
of ratifying the convention. The same cannot be said for the USA at this point in time. 
In addition to the five factors mentioned, another probable reluctance to ratifying C185 is 
section 3G of the FAL 1965 (IMO, 2016, p.24), which reinforces C185 with similar 
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provisions. Thus far, the FAL 1965 has been ratified by 120 countries, 43 of which are 
Members of C108 and 26 are Members of C185. This makes 51 other countries obligated 
to give shore leave to seafarers without visas. These countries may be satisfied with the 
FAL 1965 and do not feel pressured to ratify another convention with similar objectives. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Research conclusion and outlook for the convention 
It has been a long road for C185. Updated from C108, the new instrument was to respond 
to growing consciousness of insecurity triggered by major life changing events. 
Unfortunately, despite being generally accepted, the convention has not been widely 
ratified as expected and Members of the convention are faced with challenges in its 
implementation.  
The main difference of C185 from C108 is the introduction of biometrics as an advanced 
means of identification and the addition of three annexes. In order to successfully 
implement C185, two main requirements have to be met: 
1. the proper use of the prescribed biometric technology; and 
2. putting in place the right infrastructure for identification, verification, production 
and securing the production process of SIDs. 
The convention underwent its first amendment in 2016 in order to align the biometric 
requirement with the seventh edition of Doc 9303, a necessary change to facilitate 
implementation of C185.  
The requirements of the convention are definitely feasible and the outlook good. Apart 
from 2003 and 2009, C185 has been ratified by at least one country each year including 
2018. Putting it in perspective, e-passports and e-official travel documents, similar to e-
SIDs, have been around for a while now since they were first internationally introduced 
in 2006 by Doc 9303. Soo far, more than 100 countries are issuing these e-documents, 
increasing the probability for these countries to also ratify C185.     
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There are, nonetheless, challenges which include financial and technical complexities, 
legislative and administrative issues, few ratifications and restrictive access to shore by 
some port States. These difficulties can be surmounted with time and real commitment. 
As the popular saying goes “Rome was not built in a day”. 
6.2 Recommendations 
6.2.1 Mitigating financial and technical complexities 
Section 4.3 of chapter 4 of this dissertation provides eight possible solutions to resolve 
financial and technical bottlenecks to ratification and implementation of C185. From the 
eight, I recommend three worth pursuing because they can be more easily attained, 
provide more autonomy and better control for securing the SIDs. Developed, developing 
and under-developed countries can find a solution among these three.  
6.2.1.1 Production of SIDs by e-passport issuing authority in 
collaboration with e-SID issuing authority    
This option should first be considered by countries already issuing e-passports and/or 
participating in the ICAO PKD as it prevents them from spending twice for the same 
services. The responsibility between the authorities can be broken down into the following 
issuing processes: 
a. Receiving applications and taking biometrics of applicants; 
b. Verification of identity, citizenship/residence and authenticity of the applicant; 
c. Recording of data by receiving authority and passing file to another authority for 
authorization; 
d. Security checks such as police records, work experience or maritime school 
attended could be carried out; 
e. Production of SIDs including digital signatures, data writing and protection of SID; 
f. Printed SID checked for errors; 
g. Entry of SID data into NED; 
h. SID issued to seafarer. 
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These responsibilities be can be divided as follows: 
- Processes a-d, g & h: e-SID authority; 
- Processes e & f: e-Passport authority. 
Further internal arrangements such as logistics and cost of the SIDs can be worked on 
between the authorities. 
6.2.1.2 PPP 
This option is good for countries that are not yet producing e-passports and are not going 
to do so anytime soon. The main advantage is that the SID issuing authority can provide 
services it would normally not be able to achieve on its own. 
The issuing authority may decide to delegate all or part of the issuing processes to the 
private partner but irrespective of the type of PPP entered into, I recommend that the 
public entity has control over the CSCA for security reasons. 
6.2.1.3 Regional SID system 
Countries with few seafarers or non e-passport issuing States can benefit from this type 
of cooperation. Ideally, the countries should not be far apart geographically in order to 
reduce the cost of transportation. Participating countries will contribute towards the 
development and running of an SID system. Together, they will spend less to obtain a 
PKI and to participate in the PKD. With regards to the processes outlined in 6.2.1.1, each 
country will be responsible for processes a-d, g & h. In addition to this, the host country 
will be responsible for processes e & f and the running of a regional electronic database. 
A regional focal-point center could be optional. The cost of the SIDs may however vary 
for each country if the cost of transporting the documents, for instance, is added.  
6.2.2 Promoting confidence  
MRTDs and MROTDs are internationally recognized documents which provide 
identification to nationals traveling in and out of their countries. This has been facilitated 
by security features developed over the years for the documents by the ICAO and made 
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mandatory for all countries. The e-SID has been upgraded to these standards and in 
order to instill mutual confidence in the documents issued by Members, the ILO has put 
in place a mandatory independent evaluation and reporting system from which a list of 
compliant Members is published. Before the 2016 amendments, the Russian Federation 
was the only country which met the required standards. Members are therefore 
encouraged to take those evaluations seriously and make regular reports to the ILO. This 
list could have a positive impact in facilitating shore leave for seafarers who are nationals 
of compliant Member States. 
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Appendix I: Data Classification 
No Country Meeting 
2010 
Meeting  
2015 
Meeting 
2016 
Total  Party to the 
convention 
C108/C185? 
Difficulties encountered / 
Observations 
Obstacles to 
ratification/Observations 
01 Angola Yes No No 01 C108/1976 
 
  
02 Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Yes No No 01 C108/1983 
 
  
03 Azerbaijan Yes No No 01 C108/1992 
C185/2006 
  
04 Bahamas Yes No No 01 C185/2006 
 
  
05 Bangladesh Yes No Yes 02 C185/2014 
 
- Shore leave being 
denied to its 
seafarers in some 
ports based on the 
fact that Bangladesh 
was not included on 
the list of States that 
had ratified C108 
(2016b, P.9). 
 
06 Belarus Yes No No 01 C108/1994 
 
  
07 Brazil No Yes Yes 02 C108/1963 
C185/2010 
- Government was 
willing to promote 
collaboration 
between the national 
visa, customs and 
immigration 
authorities (2015b, 
p.5).  
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08 Bulgaria Yes No No 01 C108/1977 
 
 - Financial implications 
of the implementation 
of C185 (2010b, p.5). 
09 Cambodia No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
10 Cameroon Yes No Yes 02 C108/1982 
 
  
11 Canada Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1967 
 
 - Major port States that 
voted in favour of the 
adoption of C185 
restricted access to 
their territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3); 
- Improving its SID 
issuance system to 
the standards of 
C185 even though it 
is not a party to the 
convention. (2015b, 
p.4). 
12 Central 
African 
Republic 
Yes No No 01 /   
13 Chile No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
14 China Yes Yes Yes 03 / 
 
  
15 Congo, 
Republic of 
Yes Yes No 02 C185/2014 
 
  
16 Croatia  No Yes No 01 C185/2011   
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17 Cuba  No Yes No 01 C108/1975 
 
  
18 Denmark No Yes Yes 02 C108/1970 
 
 - Had new visa 
exemption rules for 
non-Danish seafarers 
who possessed valid 
SIDs in accordance 
with C108 and C185 
in 2014 (2015b, p.6, 
14).  
19 Egypt Yes No No 01 / 
 
 - Needed financial 
support to set up 
focal point centres; 
- Technical support on 
hardware, training, 
communication and 
infrastructure (2010b, 
p.6). 
20 France Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1967 
C185/2004 
 
- Delayed 
implementation due 
to technical and 
financial 
considerations 
(2010b, p.3; 2015b, 
p.7); 
- Implementation 
challenges linked to 
the need to adopt 
related legislation 
(2015b, p.7). 
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21 Greece Yes No No 01 C108/1963 
 
 - Major port States that 
voted in favour of the 
adoption of C185 
restricted access to 
their territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3); 
- Financial implications 
of technical 
development were 
significant; 
- Discriminatory that 
seafarers needed a 
SID in addition to a 
national passport for 
travelling while other 
persons could do so 
only with their 
passport(2010b,p.4) 
22 Georgia  No No Yes 01 C185/2015 
 
  
23 Guinea, 
Conakry 
No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
24 India No Yes Yes 02 C108/2005 
C185/2015 
 
  
25 Indonesia Yes Yes Yes 03 C185/2008 
 
- Major port States 
that voted in favour 
of the adoption of 
C185 restricted 
access to their 
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territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3) 
- Challenges in 
implementation due 
to sustainability and 
reliability of the 
source of equipment 
for continued 
issuance of SIDs 
(2015b, p.4) 
26 Iran Yes No Yes 02 C108/1967 
 
  
27 Iraq Yes No No 01 C108/1986 
 
  
28 Ireland No No Yes 01 C108/1961 
 
  
29 Italy Yes No No 01 C108/1963 
 
  
30 Japan No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
31 Kazakhstan Yes Yes No 02 C185/2010 
 
  
32 Kenya Yes No No 01 / 
 
  
33 Korea, 
Republic of 
Yes No Yes 02 C185/2007 
 
- Major port States 
that voted in favour 
of the adoption of 
C185 restricted 
access to their 
territories to 
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seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3) 
- Delayed production 
of SIDs principally 
because major port 
States had not 
ratified the 
convention (2010b, 
p.16) 
34 Latvia Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1993 
 
 - Not envisaging 
ratification essentially 
due to cost concerns 
(2015b, p.14) 
35 Lebanon Yes No No 01 / 
 
  
36 Liberia Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1981 
 
  
37 Luxembourg Yes No Yes 02 C108/1991 
C185/2011 
 
  
38 Madagascar No Yes Yes 02 C185/2007 
 
- Their seafarers 
denied shore leave 
despite issuing SIDs 
under C185. Had 
asked for technical 
assistance from ILO 
in this regard with no 
favourable reply. 
Production was 
suspended in light of 
ongoing 
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amendments 
(2016b, p.9) 
39 Malaysia Yes No Yes 02 / 
 
 - Major port States that 
voted in favour of the 
adoption of C185 
restricted access to 
their territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3) 
40 Marshall 
Islands 
Yes Yes Yes 03 C185/2011 
 
  
41 Mauritania No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
42 Mexico Yes No No 01 C108/1961 
 
  
43 Morocco No No Yes 01 C108/2001 
 
  
44 Mozambique Yes No Yes 02 / 
 
  
45 Namibia Yes No No 01 / 
 
 - Major port States that 
voted in favour of the 
adoption of C185 
restricted access to 
their territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs but not in 
possession of a visa 
(2010b, p.3, 4); 
- Needed technical 
assistance to set up 
 69 
focal point (2010b, 
p.6) 
- Discriminatory that 
seafarers needed a 
SIDs in addition to 
passports while other 
travelers only needed 
a passport (2010b, 
p.6) 
46 Nepal Yes No No 01 / 
 
  
47 Netherlands No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
48 Nigeria Yes No Yes 02 C185/2004 
 
  
49 Norway Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1970 
 
 - Major port States that 
voted in favour of the 
adoption of C185 
restricted access to 
their territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3) 
- Requirement for 
visas by some 
countries a barrier to 
ratification (2015b, 
p.14); 
- Low number of 
countries currently 
issuing SIDs (2015b, 
p.7); 
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- Objective to issue 
SIDs compliant with 
C185 without formal 
ratification (2015b, 
p.14).  
50 Panama Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1970 
 
 - Require visas before 
entry however, 
considering 
ratification (2015b, 
p.5) 
51 Peru No Yes No 01 / 
 
  
52 Philippines Yes Yes Yes 03 C185/2012 
 
- Had  experienced 
delay in 
implementation due 
to  administrative 
and budgetary 
constraints (2015b, 
p.7). 
- Hindered by technical 
and legal issues 
before ratification 
(2010b, p.5).  
53 Poland No No Yes 01 C108/1993 
 
  
54 Portugal Yes No No 01 C108/1967 
 
  
55 Russian 
Federation 
Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1969 
C185/2010 
- Major port States 
that voted in favour 
of the adoption of 
C185 restricted 
access to their 
territories to 
seafarers holding 
valid SIDs (2010b, 
p.3) 
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56 Saudi Arabia No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
57 Senegal Yes Yes No 02 / 
 
  
58 Singapore Yes No No 01 / 
 
  
59 South Africa Yes Yes Yes 03 / 
 
  
60 Spain Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1971 
C185/2016 
  
61 Switzerland Yes No Yes 02 / 
 
 - Not considering 
ratification of the 
convention as it is a 
landlocked State and 
the few Swiss 
seafarers would not 
justify the investment 
(2010b, p.12) 
62 Tanzania, 
United Rep 
of 
Yes No No 01 C108/1962 
C185/2017 
  
63 Thailand No No Yes 01 / 
 
  
64 Tunisia  Yes No Yes 02 C108/1959 
C185/2016 
  
65 United 
Kingdom 
Yes Yes Yes 03 C108/1964 
 
 - Obstacle to 
ratification lay in the 
high cost of 
producing SIDs and 
their verification and 
low benefit 
associated with few 
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ratifications (2015a, 
p.5) 
66 United 
States  
Yes Yes Yes 03 / 
 
 - Concerns over article 
6 continue to be a 
barrier to ratification 
(2010b, p.6) 
67 Uruguay Yes No No 01 C108/1973 
 
  
68 Vietnam  Yes No No 01 / 
 
  
 
 
Key 
 
        Financial and Technical difficulties                                Few ratifications   
                         
                              Restricted access to shore by major port States                               Requirements of Article 6 
 
                              Legislative and Administrative issues                                                Visa requirement 
 
 
 
 
73 
Appendix II: Ratifications of C185 
Ratifications of C185 - Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 
(No. 185) 
Date of entry into force: 09 Feb 2005 
35 Ratifications                                                      Denounced: 0 1.  
Number 
Country Date Status Note 
Albania  11 Oct 2007 In Force 
 
Azerbaijan  17 Jul 2006 In Force 
 
Bahamas  14 Dec 2006 In Force 
 
Bangladesh  28 Apr 2014 In Force 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  18 Jan 2010 In Force 
 
Brazil 21 Jan 2010 In Force 
 
Congo  14 May 2014 In Force 
 
Croatia  06 Sep 2011 In Force 
 
France  27 Apr 2004 In Force 
 
Georgia  03 Feb 2015 In Force 
 
Hungary  30 Mar 2005 In Force 
 
India  09 Oct 2015 In Force 
 
Indonesia  16 Jul 2008 In Force 
 
Jordan 09 Aug 2004 In Force 
 
Kazakhstan  17 May 2010 In Force 
 
Kiribati  06 Jun 2014 In Force 
 
Korea, Republic of  04 Apr 2007 In Force 
 
Lithuania On 14 August 2006, the Government notified 
that it provisionally applies the Convention, in accordance 
with its Article 9. 
14 Aug 2006 Not in force Provisional 
Application 
(Article 9) 
Luxembourg 20 Sep 2011 In Force 
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Country Date Status Note 
Madagascar 06 Jun 2007 In Force 
 
Maldives  05 Jan 2015 In Force 
 
Marshall Islands  24 Aug 2011 In Force 
 
Moldova, Republic of  28 Aug 2006 In Force 
 
Montenegro  27 Apr 2017 In Force 
 
Myanmar  16 Jan 2018 In Force 
 
Nigeria  19 Aug 2004 In Force 
 
Pakistan  21 Dec 2006 In Force 
 
Philippines  19 Jan 2012 In Force 
 
Russian Federation  26 Feb 2010 In Force 
 
Spain  26 May 2011 In Force 
 
Sri Lanka  02 Dec 2016 In Force 
 
Tanzania, United Republic of 11 Oct 2017 In Force 
 
Tunisia 19 May 2016 In Force 
 
Turkmenistan  12 Feb 2014 In Force 
 
Vanuatu  28 Jul 2006 In Force 
 
Yemen  06 Oct 2008 In Force 
 
 
Retrieved from  https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:: 
P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312330  
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Appendix III: Ratifications of C108 
Ratifications of C108 - Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No. 108) 
Date of entry into force: 19 Feb 1961 
64 Ratifications                            Denounced: 10 
Number 
Country Date Status Note 
Algeria  13 Aug 1991 In Force 
 
Angola  04 Jun 1976 In Force 
 
Antigua and Barbuda  02 Feb 1983 In Force 
 
Azerbaijan  19 May 1992 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 17 Jul 
2007 by 
convention 
C185 
Barbados  08 May 1967 In Force 
 
Belarus  28 Feb 1994 In Force 
 
Belize  15 Dec 1983 In Force 
 
Brazil 05 Nov 1963 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 21 Jan 
2011 by 
convention 
C185 
Bulgaria  26 Jan 1977 In Force 
 
Cameroon  29 Nov 1982 In Force 
 
Canada  31 May 1967 In Force 
 
Cuba  30 Dec 1975 In Force 
 
Czech Republic 06 Aug 1996 In Force 
 
Denmark  26 Oct 1970 In Force 
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Country Date Status Note 
Djibouti 03 Aug 1978 In Force 
 
Dominica  28 Feb 1983 In Force 
 
Estonia  11 Dec 1996 In Force 
 
Fiji 19 Apr 1974 In Force 
 
Finland 26 Oct 1970 In Force 
 
France  08 Jun 1967 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 27 Apr 
2005 by 
convention 
C185 
Ghana  19 Feb 1960 In Force 
 
Greece  09 Oct 1963 In Force 
 
Grenada  09 Jul 1979 In Force 
 
Guatemala  28 Nov 1960 In Force 
 
Guinea - Bissau 21 Feb 1977 In Force 
 
Guyana  08 Jun 1966 In Force 
 
Honduras  20 Jun 1960 In Force 
 
Iceland  26 Oct 1970 In Force 
 
India  17 Jan 2005 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 08 Oct 
2016 by 
convention 
C185 
Iran, Islamic Republic of  13 Mar 1967 In Force 
 
Iraq  23 Sep 1986 In Force 
 
Ireland  17 Jun 1961 In Force 
 
Italy 12 Aug 1963 In Force 
 
Kyrgyzstan  31 Mar 1992 In Force 
 
Latvia 08 Mar 1993 In Force 
 
Liberia  08 Jul 1981 In Force 
 
Lithuania 19 Nov 1997 In Force 
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Country Date Status Note 
Luxembourg 15 Feb 1991 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 19 Sep 
2012 by 
convention 
C185 
Malta  04 Jan 1965 In Force 
 
Mauritius  02 Dec 1969 In Force 
 
Mexico  11 Sep 1961 In Force 
 
Moldova, Republic of  23 Mar 2000 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 28 Aug 
2007 by 
convention 
C185 
Morocco  15 Oct 2001 In Force 
 
Norway 26 Oct 1970 In Force 
 
Panama  19 Jun 1970 In Force 
 
Poland 15 Mar 1993 In Force 
 
Portugal  03 Aug 1967 In Force 
 
Romania  20 Sep 1976 In Force 
 
Russian Federation  04 Nov 1969 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 26 Feb 
2011 by 
convention 
C185 
Saint Lucia  14 May 1980 In Force 
 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  21 Oct 1998 In Force 
 
Seychelles  06 Feb 1978 In Force 
 
Slovenia  30 Jan 2003 In Force 
 
Solomon Islands  06 Aug 1985 In Force 
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Country Date Status Note 
Spain  05 May 1971 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 25 May 
2012 by 
convention 
C185 
Sri Lanka  24 Nov 1995 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 02 Dec 
2017 by 
convention 
C185 
Sweden 26 Oct 1970 In Force 
 
Tajikistan 26 Nov 1993 In Force 
 
Tanzania. Tanganyika  26 Nov 1962 In Force 
 
Tunisia 26 Oct 1959 Not in force Automatic 
Denunciation 
on 19 May 
2017 by 
convention 
C185 
Turkey 07 Feb 2005 In Force 
 
Ukraine  17 Jun 1970 In Force 
 
United Kingdom In conformity with Article 1, paragraph 
2, of the Convention, fishermen shall not be regarded as 
seafarers for the purpose of this Convention. 
18 Feb 1964 In Force 
 
Uruguay  28 Jun 1973 In Force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
Appendix IV: Sample of a Seafarers’ Identity Document 
 
 
Sample of a card format of the seafarers’ identity document. Credit of the Maritime 
Administration of the Republic of Korea. Retrieved from 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/ 
publication/wcms_177102.pdf  
